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Overwhelming Retaliatory Response

The Unnecessary Destruction of Life

 

Our reductive definition of Evil hinges on the subjective definition of the word “unnecessary”— the unnecessary destruction of life.  Here we will discuss two wars of aggression and the response to aggression.  The first involves a sneak attack on a military establishment by uniformed officers of an enemy army; the second involves a sneak attack by mostly un-uniformed operatives  of an opposing military organization on a civilian population where the agressors engaged in murder, rape, torture, and kidnapping.   

 

This is a message to the thousands of naive college students demonstrating for Palestinian justice and chanting “from the river to the sea” when they have no idea which river and which sea.

What is the correct response to such aggression?  Here we argue for an overwhelming retaliatory response to assure such attacks are not repeated.

Philosophical and Legal Framework for Overwhelming Retaliatory Response

 

The justification for an overwhelming retaliatory response to aggression draws from longstanding philosophical traditions, particularly Just War Theory, and modern international legal norms. Philosophically, Just War Theory, as articulated by thinkers like Thomas Aquinas and later refined by Hugo Grotius, posits two core principles: jus ad bellum (the right to resort to war) and jus in bello (the right conduct during war). Under jus ad bellum, a state has a just cause for war in response to armed aggression, provided the response is proportional to the threat and pursued with the right intention—namely, to restore peace and security rather than vengeance. Self-defense is the archetypal just cause, rooted in the natural right to preserve one’s existence and sovereignty, as Grotius argued in De Jure Belli ac Pacis (1625). An overwhelming response can be philosophically defensible if it aims to decisively neutralize the aggressor’s capacity for future harm, thereby achieving a lasting peace, rather than a tit-for-tat exchange that perpetuates cycles of violence.

 

This is now codified in Article 51 of the UN Charter (1945), which affirms the “inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations.” Customary international law, as reflected in the Caroline doctrine (1837) , may be in need of revisions in the face of hypersonic and nuclear weapons.  Who was the aggressor when Hamas attacked Israeli civilians?  Was is simply Hamas, or was it militant jihad, the Muslim Brotherhood, and Shiite Ayatollahs in Iran? 

 

The bombing of Iran’s nuclear weapons facilities on June 22, 2025 answers the question about shared jihadi  aggression. What the U.S. and Israel view as aggression, Islam views as “Lesser Jihad:” Defensive War in Islam. There exists an insurmountable ideological divide, which Western nations ignore to their own peril. 

 

The Pearl Harbor Attack and the U.S. Response in the Pacific War

 

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, exemplifies a lawful act of aggression warranting an overwhelming retaliatory response. The strike targeted a purely military installation, the U.S. Pacific Fleet at the Pearl Harbor naval base in Hawaii, killing 2,403 military personnel and destroying or damaging 19 ships and 188 aircraft. This was a calculated first strike against a sovereign state’s armed forces, aimed at crippling U.S. naval power in the Pacific to secure Japanese expansion in Asia. Philosophically, it violated the just cause principle by initiating unprovoked aggression, invoking the U.S.’s natural right to self-defense. Under today’s Article 51 legality, it constituted an armed attack, triggering the U.S. declaration of war the following day.

 

The U.S. response, a full-scale, overwhelming campaign in the Pacific Theater, including island-hopping offensives, firebombing of Japanese cities, and atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was justified as necessary to achieve unconditional surrender and eliminate the existential threat posed by Imperial Japan’s militarism. Proportionality was met not by matching the initial strike’s scale but by the broader context: Japan’s simultaneous invasions across Asia and its doctrine of total war demanded a decisive counter to prevent further aggression. As President Roosevelt declared, it was a “date which will live in infamy,” unifying the nation for total mobilization. This response aligned with jus ad bellum by restoring security through the aggressor’s defeat, and while jus in bello  debates persist (e.g., civilian bombings), the initial military targeting at Pearl Harbor set a precedent for conventional warfare norms, where combatants engage combatants.

The Hamas Attack on October 7, 2023: A Violation of Conventional Warfare Norms 

 

In stark contrast, the Hamas-led attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, shattered the norms of conventional warfare by deliberately targeting civilians, transforming what could have been a military engagement into an act of terrorism and war crimes. Militants from Hamas and allied groups infiltrated southern Israel, massacring approximately 1,200 people, mostly civilians, at sites including kibbutzim, a music festival, and towns like Sderot. Tactics included summary executions, sexual violence, and the abduction of 251 hostages for use as bargaining chips. This was not a strike on military installations akin to Pearl Harbor but a premeditated assault on non-combatants explicitly expressing Jihadists’ view that the entire nation of Israel and its people are the enemy.

 

Philosophically, this contravenes Just War Theory’s jus in bello by failing the discrimination principle: combatants must distinguish between military objectives and civilians, a rule Aquinas deemed essential to preserve human dignity. Legally, it violated the Geneva Conventions (1949), particularly Common Article 3 prohibiting violence to life and person against those hors de combat (out of combat, injured), and Additional Protocol I (1977) banning attacks on civilians. The International Committee of the Red Cross and human rights bodies classify such acts as war crimes, including murder, torture, and hostage-taking. Hamas’s charter and statements glorify martyrdom and jihad against Jews, framing civilians as legitimate targets, which places it outside conventional warfare’s bounds—unlike Japan’s military-focused Pearl Harbor strike. This asymmetry elevates the attack to genocide-adjacent terror, demanding a response beyond mere repulsion.

Justification for Israel’s Overwhelming Response

 

Israel’s subsequent military operation in Gaza, encompassing airstrikes, ground incursions, and efforts to dismantle Hamas infrastructure, was a justified exercise of self-defense under Article 51, given the scale and intent of the October 7 aggression. Philosophically, the response fulfills jus ad bellum by addressing an existential threat: Hamas’s repeated vows to destroy Israel, coupled with its arsenal of 30,000+ rockets and cross-border tunnels, necessitated overwhelming force to achieve the “no choice of means” threshold. Proportionality is measured against the threat’s persistence, not isolated incidents; a limited response would invite recurrence, perpetuating insecurity.

 

Gaza’s status as an armed camp further bolsters this justification. Hamas has transformed the territory into a fortified military zone, embedding its operations within civilian areas: a vast tunnel network spanning hundreds of kilometers for smuggling weapons and launching attacks, command centers in hospitals and schools, and rocket launchers in residential neighborhoods. This use of human shields, prohibited under Article 51(7) of Additional Protocol I, blurs distinctions, forcing Israel to navigate a densely populated urban battlefield where military and civilian sites overlap. Legally, this does not absolve Hamas but complicates Israel’s obligations, permitting strikes on legitimate military targets even if civilian risks are elevated.

 

Compounding this, significant portions of Gaza’s population have supported Hamas’s objectives, complicating claims of universal civilian innocence. Polls conducted amid the conflict reveal sustained backing: In June 2024, 38% of Gazans supported Hamas governance, rising from 34% three months prior. By December 2024, nearly two-thirds favored Hamas leading or participating in a post-war Palestinian government. Even in May 2025, support hovered at 37%, with many endorsing armed resistance against Israel. This widespread alignment, rooted in ideological sympathy for Hamas’s eliminationist goals, means much of the population shares in perpetuating jihad whether through active participation or passive tolerance of militarization. Philosophically, this echoes Grotius’s view that a populace complicit in aggression forfeits some protections; legally, it underscores the necessity of dismantling the regime to prevent future attacks, as partial measures would leave the “armed camp” intact. By extension, it justifies the elimination of future harm by finding ways to inhibit Hamas’ international sponsors, especially the evolving Axes of Evil.

 

In sum, while Pearl Harbor exemplified conventional aggression met with justified total war, Hamas’s civilian-targeted barbarity demanded an equally resolute Israeli response to eradicate a hybrid military-civilian threat. Both cases affirm that overwhelming retaliation, when rooted in self-preservation and aimed at lasting security, upholds the moral and legal imperatives of sovereignty.

Philosophical and Legal Framework Applied to the Ukraine-Russia Conflict
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